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Abstract: 
 
The paper presents a club theoretic model of a city. In the model welfare in a city de-
pends on its size because of positive and negative externalities (or agglomeration 
economies and diseconomies) generated by close proximity of people and economic 
activities. Technological externalities appear in people’s utility functions and pecuni-
ary externalities are due to shortcomings of the price mechanism. Both types of exter-
nalities are internalised in the city and act as centripetal and centrifugal forces that 
explain migration and thus the formation and development of the city. The issue of 
optimal city size is studied and it is found that the individually originated formation 
mechanism of the city may lead to non-optimal solutions.    
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 1 Introduction 
Cites are spatial concentrations of people and economic activities. The dominant rea-
sons behind the existence of modern cities are connected to the economic perform-
ance of the market. Since most market activities are very spatial in nature, the prox-
imity of people and the functions that they engage with in their everyday life has ob-
vious implications to the welfare that the economic environment is able to create. 
People choose their place of living so as to maximise their welfare and make calcula-
tions of benefits and costs attached to different sites. Observed growth of some cities 
is simply to say that they can create higher welfare for their citizen than those places 
that people are leaving from. So, the existence and development of cities must be ex-
plained by their capability to create welfare.  
 
An economic explanation of the existence and development of cities consists of cen-
tripetal forces such that draw people closer to each other, and of centrifugal forces 
such that throw them apart. A standard presumption in the literature of urban econom-
ics is that there is a connection between city size and welfare. This kind of a connec-
tion can be explained by so called agglomeration economies that arise in the produc-
tion and consumption of the outputs of the local private and public sectors in the city. 
According to the theory of agglomeration economies an increase of the size of a city 
yields benefits and cost savings, but eventually it may bring up also falling benefits 
and increasing costs. Main gains caused by agglomeration economies are experienced 
as higher labour incomes brought up by specialisation and increased choices in work, 
wider consumption facilities of private and public goods and services, cost savings in 
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arranging the provision of collective goods, larger variety of leisure activities and bet-
ter opportunities for all kinds of interaction. Among the main disadvantages caused by 
agglomeration diseconomies are increased housing costs, commuting costs and other 
costs of living, high local taxes and tariffs, increased risks of health and property 
damage caused by pollution and crime, aggravating social problems and other such 
congestion costs.  
 
Agglomeration economies and diseconomies are due to externalities and economies of 
scale. Without these kinds of market failures a totally dispersed spatial pattern would 
sustain. In the presence of externalities, both positive and negative, people not only 
respond to the observed benefits and costs but also affect them and thereby the wel-
fare anticipated by others by their choices. From club-theoretic viewpoint, the essen-
tial nature of the city is to pool up the positive and negative effects of agglomeration 
and to internalise the externalities into people’s everyday welfare experiences. Be-
cause the externality problem is so apparent in the context of a city, city size must be 
a central economic variable - it is the optimal size of the city that actually facilitates 
full internalisation of externalities. 
  
The paper examines the formation and development of a city based on decision-
making of utility maximising people or households. Firms are ignored by assuming 
that they decide on their production and location so as to maximise their profits, and 
the provision of local collective goods is assumed to be efficient. This is to say that 
the decisions of firms and the local public sector, which are also affected by agglom-
eration economies and diseconomies, are properly reflected by the market information 
faced by the people. The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the connec-
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tion of agglomeration economies and diseconomies and city size, and chapter 3 trans-
forms individual utility maximisation into a club-theoretic framework. Chapter 4 il-
lustrates the model of a city, and chapter 5 compares possible solutions for city size 
from the point of view of efficiency. Chapter 6 concludes the findings.  
 
2 Agglomeration economies and externalities 
The centripetal and centrifugal forces that explain the formation of a city are here 
simply called agglomeration economies and diseconomies (Krugman, 1991; Fujita & 
Thisse, 2002). People gather together because of agglomeration economies, and they 
drift apart because of diseconomies that arise in overly concentrated surroundings. 
From the point of view of an individual household, the effects of agglomeration can 
be divided into direct and indirect effects (cf. Richardson, 1973).  
 
The direct effects are the household effects that are experienced in the local goods and 
factor markets. The variety, quality and attainability of private and collective goods, 
occupation, housing, leisure activities, environment etc. are all locally determined and 
depend on agglomeration. Positive effects arise as concentration of economic activi-
ties brings up greater multiplicity of choice of private and collective goods and ser-
vices, facilitates deeper specialisation and remunerating occupation, and makes it pos-
sible to enjoy a broader variety of urban amusements on one’s leisure. Negative ef-
fects arise as concentration eventually causes physical and psychic congestion that 
depresses the enjoyment. Agglomeration diseconomies emerge in large-scale cities 
e.g. in the form of crowding, pollution and crime.  
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The indirect effects arise because spatial concentration of economic activities creates 
general economies on the level of the local marketplace. Performing the functions of 
the local economy involves a wide variety of physical contacts, travel and transport in 
the commodity and factor markets. All these actions are costly in terms of both money 
and time, and the rate of spatial concentration has considerable effect on the costs. 
The indirect effects are called business and social agglomeration economies and dis-
economies.  
 
Business firms derive several economies from the size of local factor and product 
markets. They may derive economies of scale in their own production decisions, lo-
calisation economies within industries sharing the same spatial marketplace, and ur-
banisation economies from the overall economic activity in one area. The social ag-
glomeration economies and diseconomies are canalised through the local public sec-
tor. The local public sector can also utilise scale economies, cost sharing etc. in its 
service production. But, in an overly crowded city the advantages of size become to 
diminish. Agglomeration diseconomies are mainly due to the fact that the city is a 
physical construction that involves land use. A plain fact is that the more agglomera-
tion there is, the scarcer land becomes. Constructing and maintaining an economi-
cally, socially and environmentally sustainable technical and social city infrastructure 
becomes the more costly the more crowded the area is Agglomeration diseconomies 
arise, when congestion starts to cause extra production costs due to rising land rents 
and delivery costs. The business and social agglomeration economies and disecono-
mies are indirect in that they, through the working of the local market, eventually end 
up to effects on the households’ welfare.  
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Agglomeration economies and diseconomies are essentially externalities in nature in 
that the choices made by individual agents affect other agent’s welfare in the city. Ex-
ternalities are of two kinds, technological externalities that affect the utility function, 
and pecuniary externalities that operate through the price mechanism (Scitovsky, 
1954; Fujita & Thisse, 2002).  
 
Technological externality is the effect of an economic activity on the consumption set 
and the utility function of an individual. The effect concerns an agent other than the 
one exerting this economic activity. Technological externalities are anticipated in eve-
ryday life and they include both physical and psychic factors. Due to technical exter-
nalities the arguments in people’s welfare functions differ in cities of different size. 
Technological externalities have a close match to the above definition of household 
agglomeration economies and diseconomies. However, business and social agglom-
eration economies and diseconomies such that affect the consumption sets and do not 
work through the price system may also be regarded to be externalities of this type. 
 
Pecuniary externalities affect people’s welfare through the price system. Those busi-
ness and social agglomeration economies and diseconomies that have effects on 
wages, on the prices of private goods and housing, and on local taxes are this kind of 
externalities. It is assumed here that the local business sector and the local public sec-
tor are competitive and effective in their decision-making, finance and production. 
This assumption implies that the pecuniary business and social agglomeration econo-
mies and diseconomies revert to unbiased market price parameters faced by the 
households. What is not ruled out, however, is the effects of the migrants themselves 
to wages, prices and taxes in the city. Migrants with market power induce pecuniary 
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effects, which they do not take into account in their own decisions. Therefore, the set 
of market prices may still be biased. 
 
In the presence of externalities, individual decisions imply market power and intro-
duce a certain collective, or club theoretic, element into the mechanism of the forma-
tion of a city (Tiebout, 1956; Buchanan, 1965). The key thing is that, from the club 
theoretic viewpoint, the external effects are internalised into the households’ utility 
within a city (Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Scotchmer,1994). It must be noted, however, 
that there may exist also interregional externalities that are not internalised. Agglom-
eration boosts up the systemic functions of big cities as a diffusion source for innova-
tion and development impulses within regions and down the national urban hierarchy.  
 
3 The club theoretic nature of a city 
In a market economy, individual people choose their sites of residence in order to 
maximise utility. A standard problem of constrained utility maximisation of an indi-
vidual or a household reads 
 
(1) Max U(qx,qy,l)  s.t.  w(1-l) + k = pxqx + pyqy, 
 
where U is the utility function, qx and qy are the quantities of private and collective 
consumption, respectively, and l is leisure. These are the endogenous variables. In the 
budget constraint, w is the market rent (or wage) for work time 1-l, where the total 
available time is normalised to unity, k is the non-labour income, and px and py are the 
market prices for private and collective goods, respectively. These are the exogenous 
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market parameters. By (1), the individual is assumed to derive utility from the 
amounts of private and collective consumption and from leisure. The standard proper-
ties concerning the shape of the utility function are assumed. The budget constraint 
says that all labour and non-labour income on the income side is spent on private and 
collective consumption during the considered time period. As is well seen, the prob-
lem (1) cannot be solved without further restrictions, but the formulation suffices to 
illustrate the main idea of the analysis.  
 
By the above argumentation, both the endogenous variables and the exogenous pa-
rameters in (1) are affected by externalities that are attached to agglomeration. There-
fore, they can be expressed as functions of city size. Actually, it is the spatial prox-
imity (or density) of the elements of the local market that explains agglomeration 
economies. However, it is simpler to use population as a measure of city size. This is 
reasonable, when the geographical area of the city is taken as given in the short-term. 
 
 Denote the population in the city by n, and write qx = qx(n) and qy = qy(n). This is to 
say that the sets of private and collective goods may differ between cities of different 
size. Moreover, l = l(n) says that the amount and quality of leisure may vary between 
cities. This is explained by time saving due to specialisation in work, and by quality-
of-life arguments. Implicitly it also includes the non-monetary emoluments of work. 
The connection of the endogenous variables to city size is explained by technical ex-
ternalities. In the budget constraint, w = w(n) refers to the wage effect of specialisa-
tion, and px = px(n), py = py(n) refer to the business and social effects of agglomeration 
on the market price of the private good and on the tax price of the collective good. 
Pecuniary externalities affect the formation of both prices. The non-labour income k = 
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k(n) may also be assumed to be locality-dependent as far as the required market trans-
actions are spatial in nature.  
 
The club-theoretic property of the city is to say that the agglomeration economies and 
diseconomies are transformed into locally experienced welfare. Now, since all the 
relevant arguments in the utility function and all the variables and parameters in the 
budget constraint depend on n, we can rewrite the problem (1) in a standard club theo-
retic form (Buchanan, 1965; Cornes & Sandler, 1986) as 
 
(2) Max W s.t. W = B(n) –C(n), 
 
where W is individual welfare (or net benefit), B is the individual benefits experienced 
in the city and C is the individual net monetary costs of living in the city. The benefit 
side is refers to the utility function in (1), and the cost side refers to the budget con-
straint in (1). Technological externalities operate on the benefit side, and pecuniary 
externalities operate on the cost side. 
 
By (2), the benefits and the costs and therefore also the welfare experienced in the 
city depend on city size. A conventional assumption is that agglomeration economies 
dominate at earlier stages of city growth, but that agglomeration diseconomies even-
tually start to dominate in overly crowded surroundings. On the benefit side it is quite 
obvious that the variety and quality of private and collective goods and leisure in-
crease with city size, but that congestion and crowding in the streets and shops, pollu-
tion, damage, crime and other unpleasant characters eventually arise and cause the 
benefit to fall. On the cost side, city growth facilitates higher wages for less work, 
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lowers prices of private goods and housing, cuts taxes and search costs and so on. 
But, as the geographical area of the city becomes overly congested, land rents, traffic 
and other transaction costs, infrastructure costs etc. start to rise up.  
 
Expression (2) is written in terms of an individual household. In principle, the prob-
lem is now in solvable form since there is only one variable, namely n, to be solved. It 
cannot, however, be solved by any individual household alone, because individuals 
cannot choose such a variable as n, the size of a city. What they can do is to decide on 
whether or not to move in a city of certain size. As an optimisation problem, expres-
sion (2) can be solved only collectively - the city as a club is able to do that provided 
that it is provided with necessary instruments. Therefore, allowing for free mobility, 
expression (2) has two interpretations. On one hand, expression (2) describes how 
people make their location decisions by comparing all kinds of benefits and costs at-
tached to different locations. And on the other hand, expression (2) describes the util-
ity maximisation of an individual as a full member of the club that he resides in.  
 
4 Illustration of the model  
Assume that the geographical size of the city is set at its long-term optimum. Assume 
also that there are no inter-city externalities. This is to say people’s perceptions about 
the benefits and costs associated with a city fully reflect social values. Provided that 
firms maximise profits and that the local public sector is efficient, agglomeration 
economies and diseconomies end up to be experienced by people in the city.  
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In order to fully understand the club theoretic nature of a city, start by examining the 
total welfare, which the city can produce for the whole of its citizen (Richardson, 
1973; Fujita, 1989). Define TW = nW = nB(n) – nC(n) = TB – TC. The total benefit 
function TB = nB(n) is assumed to be S-shaped. Taking the geographical area of the 
locality as fixed at long-term optimum, the function starts from the origin. On low 
population levels the increase in total benefits is exponential. This is because increas-
ing population brings up a variety of agglomeration economies in goods and factor 
markets, including all kinds of monetary and non-monetary emoluments of urban life. 
However, the inevitable increase in congestion causes agglomeration diseconomies to 
arise. The rate of growth of the total benefits begins to fall at the point, where ag-
glomeration diseconomies start to dominate. The total cost function TC = nC(n) is 
assumed to be of inverted S-shape. This is reasonable because considerable agglom-
eration economies are due to appear, when n rises from very low levels. The cost 
function rises at a falling rate as agglomeration diseconomies eventually occur with 
increasing density. Agglomeration economies dominate until the fixed factor, the ge-
ography, becomes scarce enough so that agglomeration diseconomies start to domi-
nate. At this point, the total cost function starts to rise at an increasing rate.  
 
The curvatures of the TB and TC functions are familiar from standard cost theory. In 
the theory of the firm, the fixed cost determines in the short run the shape of the total 
cost function. Here the fixed factor is the geographical area of the city. In the long 
run, the fixed cost is also a choice variable in the firm’s decision-making. So is also 
the geographical area in the case of cities - in the long run, both population and the 
geography are chosen optimally so as to reach to the highest possible welfare. At the 
long-term optimum agglomeration economies are fully utilised from the household, 
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business and social perspectives. Figure 1 illustrates the above assumptions about the 
total benefit and total cost functions.  
 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
Figure 1 is drawn on the assumption that on very low population levels total costs of a 
city-like structure exceed total benefits from utilising it, but after a certain population 
level, namely no, benefits become higher than costs. The benefit side expanding in a 
diminishing rate, and the cost side eventually exploding, there will emerge another 
intersection point at p. When population in the city exceeds np, total costs will again 
exceed total benefits. The curve TW, drawn as a vertical sum of the TB and TC curves, 
presents the total welfare. Since the TB and TC functions include all kinds of benefits 
and costs perceived by the people, then TW, the net of TB and TC presents the attain-
able welfare that the locality can generate for its residents. Therefore, TW is the rele-
vant measure for social welfare within the city. Without interregional externalities, the 
TW’s give the relevant measure also when considered from the viewpoint of the 
whole society consisting of a multiple of localities.  
 
Total welfare in a city is an abstract concept, and it is by no means the driving force 
of any market-like mechanism. In their decision-making on residential location, indi-
viduals do not care about the total benefits and costs. In stead, individuals seek for 
their own good only, and base their migration decisions on calculations of personally 
perceived benefits and costs. Therefore, the concepts of total welfare presented in the 
upper panel of Figure 1 are not relevant for the individuals and thus not for the work-
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ing of the market mechanism. The concepts must be elaborated to match to individual 
perceptions.  
 
The simplest way to proceed is to assume that all individuals are alike and derive the 
average per capita benefit and cost, and the respective average welfare schedules from 
the TB, TC and TW curves. These concepts are presented in the lower panel of Figure 
1 Note that the scale of the vertical axis is changed from the upper panel. The per cap-
ita (or average) benefit and cost functions read B = TB/n and C = TC/n, respectively. 
By the properties of the TB and TC functions, B is inverted U shaped, and C is U 
shaped. The marginal benefit function, MB = dTB/dn, is a linear approximation of the 
curvature of the total benefit function TB. By intuition, MB is the effect that one im-
migrant has on the total benefits perceived by all members of the locality. By the 
properties of the total benefit function, the marginal benefit function MB is inverted 
U-shaped. Likewise, the U-shaped marginal cost function, MC = dC/dn, measures one 
immigrant’s effect on total costs perceived by the whole population in the locality. 
Since C presents average numbers, adding a number smaller/higher than the average 
makes the average to fall/rise. Therefore, because MC describes the added numbers, it 
must strike through C, the average number, from below at the minimum point of C. 
By the same token, MB must strike through B from above at the maximum point of B.  
 
The average concepts illustrate the individual experience, and match to the maximisa-
tion problem (2). The concepts deserve attention in two respects. First, they facilitate 
an accurate or even cardinal treatment of individual welfare (Ng, 2000), and second, 
they are straightforwardly operational in the preference-revealing mechanism of mi-
gration. The assumption of homogeneous people may sound critical, however. An al-
 13 
ternative and less stringent interpretation might be that the average concepts are those 
of the representative household, and that they are eventually revealed by the system-
atic migration pattern. The decisions of the non-representative households thus belong 
to the purely stochastic element of migration.   
 
Figure 1 is drawn on the assumption that the total benefit maximising population nb is 
higher than the total cost minimising number na. This is based on the standard view 
that agglomeration diseconomies appear on the benefit side in more congested sur-
roundings than they do on the cost side. The inverted U shaped W curve presents the 
welfare per person, drawn as a vertical sum of the B and C curves. The per capita wel-
fare is positive between no and np, creating a motive for possible immigration from 
places with lower welfare. The MW curve presents marginal welfare and, as a presen-
tation of marginal net benefit, it is a vertical sum of the MB and MC curves. Again by 
the properties of the benefit and cost functions, MW strikes through W from above at 
the maximum point of W.  
 
The graphs in Figure 1 must be considered from ex post perspective. The functions 
present the benefits and costs that appear to individual people and to the city as a 
whole only at a certain population level. That is, the curves can be drawn only up till 
that population level that the private decision-making has driven it. Anticipations 
about their development forwards from that point are totally irrelevant as to private 
decisions. Particularly, a potential newcomer encounters the situation as given by the 
choices made before him, and he does not take into account the effect that he may 
have on the situation faced by the next immigrant after him. 
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5 Three solutions for city size 
By Figure 1, the solution to the optimal city size seems to be straightforward.  Given 
the above assumptions about the forms of benefit and cost functions, and that the net 
of them measures social welfare, the question about the most preferred size of the city 
becomes a standard club theoretic optimisation problem. From the point of view of 
economic efficiency population should be chosen so that total welfare is maximised. 
In Figure 1 total welfare reaches its maximum at the culmination point of the TW 
curve. The optimum condition is dTW/dn = 0, which yields dTB/dn = dTC/dn in terms 
of the upper panel of Figure 1. Equivalently, in terms of the B and C functions in the 
lower panel of Figure 1, the condition may be stated as MB = MC, or MW = 0. This is 
to say that marginal benefits (the slope of TB) must equal marginal costs (the slope of 
TC) in the optimum. The above condition gives n* as the social welfare maximising 
optimal population of the city. In the lower panel of Figure 1, the product of n* and 
W(n*) equals the value TW(n*) in the upper panel. Welfare is maximal because, at n*, 
agglomeration economies are optimally utilised in production and consumption of 
private and public goods with respect to agglomeration diseconomies.  
 
The issue of city size is, however, more complicated. A most important question is 
whether the socially optimal solution depicted above is actually reached in a system 
based on individual utility maximisation. Individual decision-making with respect to 
the formation of a city can be divided to the purely individual choice of residential 
location, and to the collective choice on city size. As a matter of fact, purely individ-
ual migration and collective optimisation may, under certain circumstances, be effi-
cient in a general equilibrium model with a multiple of cities (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 
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1980, p. 533-535), but the solutions are necessarily not efficient in a partial equilib-
rium model of one particular city.  
 
In order to examine the outcomes of individual decision-making and their possible 
deviations from the socially optimal solution, take the perspective of the individual’s 
maximisation problem expressed in (2) and concentrate on the lower panel of Figure 
1. The lower panel is redrawn and somewhat reorganised in Figure 2. 
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
Recall that the socially optimal solution occurs at E, the intersection of MB and MC 
curves. The intuition is that the effect that the last immigrant has on total benefits in 
the locality must be equal to the respective effect on total costs. Equivalently, the op-
timum can be found at the point, where the MW curve strikes through the horizontal 
axis. This is the point where the opposite marginal effects, brought up by the last im-
migrant, just cancel out. At the optimal population level n*, the total welfare in the 
city, described here by the area beneath the MB curve and above the MC curve, is 
maximal. By definition, this area equals the area beneath the MW curve. An even sim-
pler measure of the total welfare is the area given by the product of n* and W(n*). 
 
What would then be the market solution given by purely individual migration? As-
sume that all individuals are perfectly aware about the benefits and costs associated 
with the sites under consideration, and that they are able to calculate and compare all 
physic and psychic benefits and costs commensurably in monetary terms. Assuming 
also that migration is costless, it is the possible welfare gains that motor up spatial 
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evolution. People choose whether or not to immigrate into a city of certain size. The 
city under inspection will attract newcomers as long as it can provide higher welfare 
than their original sites of residence. Supposing that the initial population in the city is 
large enough so that welfare is positive, and that there are other localities in the econ-
omy with zero welfare, the locality will attract newcomers up to P, the intersection of 
B and C curves. The market solution is a locality of np residents. The individual wel-
fare, not only for the last immigrant, but also for all previous residents becomes zero. 
If the welfare in the delivering places is higher than zero, migration will continue until 
the welfare differentials are equalised, and the population solution may be anywhere 
leftwards from np. In any case, alas with continuing immigration, all citizens become 
to enjoy the benefits and costs of increased population, and the external effects of 
immigration are internalised into local welfare as is reflected by the curvatures of B, C 
and W in Figure 2.  
 
The market solution described above is a stable market equilibrium generated by in-
dividual gain seeking. Yet, this equilibrium is not an efficient one. This is because 
expansion to np evokes total costs up till point e on the MC curve, and total benefits 
up till point e’ on the MB curve. The welfare loss is described by the area Eee’, which 
is equal to n* times W(n*). The market solution based on free migration is not socially 
optimal because individual choices are discrete by nature - they cannot choose n as a 
true choice variable, and therefore do not maximise expression (2). Individual deci-
sions tend to drive the location too big. In order to attain to higher personal welfare, 
true optimisation on n should be warranted. The optimum solution at E in Figure 2 is 
clearly a planning solution - individuals with free entry to the locality, and with being 
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worse off in their initial sites, would rather continue immigration towards point P. 
Public intervention would be necessary in order to secure efficiency. 
 
Next, consider the case of collective choice, and assume a decentralised system, 
where cities are autonomous enough to decide on their spatial and populational char-
acters. Taking the residents of the city as a collective - or a club - and assuming that 
they are equipped with preference revealing mechanisms such that facilitate the 
maximization of the collective’s welfare, then n is a continuous choice variable in the 
model. Individuals alone cannot choose optimal n’s, but together, as a collective they 
can. There are two viewpoints that can be taken into the optimal choice of the size of 
the city. Cornes & Sandler (1986, p. 164-167) call these the within-club approach and 
the total economy approach. 
 
According to the within-club approach, the optimal size of the city is set so as to 
maximise the welfares of the individual residents of the city. In the simplified setting 
of Figure 2, this is equal to maximisation of the average welfare W in the city. There-
fore, optimal population must be set to n’, which is the population that maximises W. 
At the culmination point c, the optimum condition dW/dn = 0 satisfies the standard 
condition of a club theoretic population optimum, namely that the effect of the last 
newcomer on the benefits of each previous citizen must equal the respective effect on 
the costs side. To put it more formally, dB/dn = dC/dn. Implementation of the policy 
rule is to say that newcomers are allowed to immigrate up till the welfare of every in-
dividual citizen reaches its maximum, at which point the entrance to the city is then 
shut. The cities can exert this kind of power by various direct and indirect measures. 
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These include city planning and housing policies, limits in service provision etc. 
(Brueckner, 1982.) 
 
The solution of the within-club approach, however, is not socially optimal in the par-
tial equilibrium model of one city. By Figure 2 it is evident that the optimum given by 
the within-club policy rule does not correspond to the social optimum. More pre-
cisely, a within-club city remains sub-optimal in population, n’ <  n*. Because total 
welfare is not maximised by the within-club rule, a welfare loss measured by the area 
n’cn* is caused. An equivalent measure for the welfare loss can be derived by calcu-
lating the geometric difference between the area given by the product of n*’ and 
W(n*) and that given by the product of n’ and W(n’). 
 
The total economy approach says that the local government should optimise on the 
population of the city so as to maximise the welfare sum in the city. By this approach, 
it is not the average welfare W but the sum of individual welfares, namely nW = TW 
in the present model, that is to be maximised. Therefore, the total economy approach 
reproduces the above efficient solution at E, and the corresponding choice of n*. Note 
that since entrance to the city is closed not until after the n*th immigrant, a fall of in-
dividual welfare is caused as compared to the above within-club case.  
 
It is very interesting to see that the optimum of the within-club case implies a smaller 
city than the socially optimal solution of the total economy approach. The result is 
invariant of the assumption about the relative shapes of the TB and TC functions, and 
it only reflects the fact that total welfare is the product of population and individual 
welfare, TW = nW, and that the loss in individual welfare is more than compensated 
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by the increasing number of residents up to n*. This is to say that the collective as a 
whole benefits from extra members while the members themselves suffer.  
 
As far as one city is concerned in a partial equilibrium context, the analysis shows 
that a pure market solution based on free mobility cannot end up to an efficient out-
come. Furthermore, the within-club solution yielded by individual welfare maximisa-
tion remains also sub-optimal. Only a city that takes the total economy approach will 
end up to an efficient solution. Need for a social planner taking the total economy ap-
proach appears to be inevitable.  
 
6 Conclusions 
The paper presents a simple club theoretic model of the interdependence of city size 
and welfare. Agglomeration economies and diseconomies attached to city size inter-
nalise into people’s benefits and costs of city life, and people respond by migration to 
possible differences in welfare provided by different cities.  
 
The analysis shows that free migration of people cannot serve alone as a market 
mechanism such that would secure optimal formation of a city. Therefore, the city 
itself must act as a true market agent and choose its optimal population. In operating 
this function, there are two competing criteria of optimality, the within-club approach 
that aims to maximise the welfare of the individual members of the city, and the total 
economy approach that aims to maximise the welfare city as a whole. Astonishingly 
enough, these criteria produce different solutions: in terms of efficiency the total 
economy approach is superior to the within-club approach.  
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 The results have interesting implications concerning the role of local governments. 
The results emphasize the fact that optimisation of population is an essential function 
of the local governments. This kind of a function has traditionally been banned at 
least in Finland. Furthermore, the results suggest that a particular city should take the 
total economy approach and maximise the total welfare experienced in the city even 
though it depresses the individually perceived welfare levels. It might, however, be 
argued that the within-club approach is more relevant in practice than the total econ-
omy approach. This is because of four reasons.  
 
The first reason in favour of the within-club approach concerns the availability of 
data. Operating the total-economy viewpoint necessitates calculations of total welfare 
and/or marginal benefits and costs. These concepts are far more abstract than the av-
erage welfare and average benefits and costs, which are observed by the citizen and 
revealed by elections and polls. The average concepts are observable also from the 
systematic patterns of migration. It is easy to conclude that, since the operation of the 
planning-oriented total economy approach suffers from severe data problems whereas 
the within-club approach can be based simply on everyday experience, it is quite ob-
vious that the latter would be chosen in practice.  
 
The second evidence in favour of the within-club approach is given by the elegance of 
the modelling technique. The formation of a city as a club is motored by individual 
utility maximisation, and migration between cities derives from selfish economic rea-
sons. It would be odd to assume that, after people have entered the city club, they 
would change their perspective from this selfish orientation towards a more altruistic 
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total economy approach. This would imply that while they make their migration deci-
sions so as to maximise on W(n) = B(n) – C(n)  according to the optimisation problem 
(2), they, at the same time, take part in the collective decision-making in their present 
site of residence by maximising a different utility function, namely TW(n) = nW(n) = 
n(B(n)-C(n)). Since the solutions to these functions clearly are different, this kind of a 
change in behaviour seems too inconsistent to be accepted without further reasoning. 
It is much more elegant to assume that people will continue to be selfish in the collec-
tive decision-making and apply the within-club approach.  
 
Third, there is the question about the construction of the local government. In prac-
tice, local governance is usually constructed on the basis of representative democracy. 
Taken that people are selfish in their utility maximisation, they will vote for those de-
cisions/electorates that promote their personal welfare. Electoral candidates who de-
clare the total-economy approach would simply not be elected, or they would be re-
placed in the following election. The within-club approach is implicit in the system of 
representative democracy.  
 
And fourth, as it seems that representative democracy may induce inefficient solu-
tions, the results seem to imply that collective decision-making mechanisms should be 
constructed on social-planner–based maximisation of the total welfare of the collec-
tive irrespective of the individual welfares of the voters. This kind of a reform could 
quite plausibly be implemented, but it would not necessarily solve the problem if the 
households’ utility maximisation pattern remained unchanged. The oppression of the 
voters’ will would induce them to vote with their feet. If there were other locations 
with higher welfare than W(n*), the induced emigration would eventually nullify the 
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social planner’s optimisation. The major problem with a total economy type solution 
is that it is not necessarily stable. 
 
To sum up, it seems plausible that cities either grow too big (because of purely indi-
vidualistic migration) or remain too small (because of within-club type optimisation) 
with reference to the socially optimal size. However, the evidence of the model of an 
isolated city is less rigorous in practice than in theory. On one hand, it must be noted 
that the problems of reaching to the optimal size appears on the falling regime of the 
welfare curve. This is to say that the city is big enough so that the net effect of ag-
glomeration economies and diseconomies is negative. In practice, most cities are on 
the rising part of their welfare curves, and they are not at all in the position to con-
sider optimisation by welfare grounds. On the second hand, while the solutions are 
unambiguously inefficient in the partial equilibrium model of one city, both the purely 
migration-driven market solution and the within-club type collective solution can, un-
der certain conditions, be socially efficient, when the general equilibrium of multiple 
cities is considered.  
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Figure 1: Benefits, costs and welfare generated in a city 
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Figure 2: Three possible solutions for city size  
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